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INTRODUCTION1 
Benjy Unger was nineteen. He was a deeply devout Orthodox Jew. 
Benjy was also gay. 
After years of struggling with his sexual orientation and the conflict it 
generated with his religious community, first in secret and then with his 
rabbis and teachers in Brooklyn, Benjy confided in his parents. His father 
gave him the phone number for a “Rabbi Arthur Goldberg” and told Benjy 
he’d heard Goldberg could help. 
Rabbi Goldberg told Benjy that he’d called the right man. Goldberg 
had helped literally hundreds of young men just like Benjy—men from 
Orthodox Jewish and conservative religious communities across the 
country dealing with what he called “unwanted same-sex attraction.” And 
his program, his proven, scientific program, could turn Benjy straight in 
two to four years. 
As Rabbi Goldberg explained, Benjy wasn’t actually gay. In fact, he 
assured Benjy, homosexuality didn’t exist at all. Through some 
combination of a distant father, overbearing mother, and sensitive 
personality, Benjy had experienced “childhood wounds” that knocked him 
off the heterosexual path and generated same-sex attraction (SSA). With 
time, and with the therapy Goldberg could provide, Benjy would overcome 
these wounds, his SSA would diminish, and he would begin to experience 
the opposite-sex attraction (OSA) he craved. 
This conversation with Rabbi Goldberg left Benjy “ecstatic”; it was 
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vision in crafting the Complaint which led directly to the verdict, and this Essay. Thanks to Sacha 
Baniel-Stark for your invaluable advice, and to the entire staff at Northwestern University Law Review 
Online for your skill and patience. This Essay is dedicated to Benjy, Chaim, Michael, and Sheldon. 
Thank you for your courage. 
** Editor’s Note: Copies of court filings, opinions, orders, transcripts, and exhibits from Ferguson 
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1 The details included in this Introduction are drawn from Benjy Unger’s testimony on June 3–4, 
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everything he wanted to hear. He wrote his first check and started treatment 
shortly thereafter. 
“Rabbi Goldberg,” however, was not a Rabbi at all, but rather a 
disbarred lawyer previously convicted of conspiring to defraud the United 
States.2 His organization, “Jews Offering New Alternatives to 
Homosexuality,” later renamed “Jews Offering New Alternatives for 
Healing” (JONAH), did not refer Benjy to a doctor, but rather sent him to 
an unlicensed “life coach” whose only academic qualification was an 
undergraduate degree in music and theater.3 The vaunted “JONAH 
Program” relied on an obsolete set of therapeutic practices rejected by 
every mainstream medical association since the mid-1970s—practices now 
understood to be not only ineffective, but actively harmful. 
Benjy was indeed harmed. Under the guise of treatment, Benjy’s 
“therapist” Alan Downing—himself “ex-gay”—convinced the young man 
to undress in one-on-one counseling sessions, while Downing stood so 
close that Benjy could feel the older man’s breath on the back of his neck. 
In group sessions with other “journeyers,” the term given to other clinic 
patients, Benjy was instructed to slam a tennis racket into a pillow 
representing his mother until his hands bled, while screaming at her for 
causing him to be gay. He received what JONAH called “healthy touch,” 
when he would be cradled by other “ex-gay” men decades his senior for up 
to half an hour at a time. This “treatment” cost $100 per one-hour session, 
with occasional $650 “weekend retreats.” By the time he left JONAH, 
Benjy’s relationship with his parents was all but destroyed. Depression 
rendered him nonfunctional for months. And yes, he was still gay. 
Benjy Unger, like thousands of other vulnerable men and women, was 
a victim of “conversion therapy,”4 a pseudoscientific treatment advertised 
as capable of changing an individual’s sexual orientation. The Southern 
Poverty Law Center (SPLC), alongside Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 
in New York and Lite DePalma Greenberg in New Jersey, helped Benjy 
and three other victims sue Goldberg and Downing for consumer fraud5—
the first consumer fraud claim filed against conversion therapists in the 
nation.6 All four victims shared the same story: Goldberg reeled them in 
 
2 Transcript of Trial at 82, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 8, 
2015). 
3 Transcript of Trial at 134, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 
11, 2015). 
4 The term “conversion therapy” is considered derogatory by proponents of the practice, who prefer 
terms such as “gender affirming practices,” “reparative therapy,” or “sexual orientation change efforts.” 
I use the term “conversion therapy” because it is the term generally used to describe the practice of 
treating unwanted homosexuality through therapy, not as a derogation of those practices. 
5 Complaint and Jury Demand at 1–2, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. Nov. 27, 2012). 
6 Susan K. Livio, Group Claiming to Turn Gay Men Straight Committed Consumer Fraud, N.J. 
Jury Says, NJ.COM (June 25, 2015, 8:08 PM) 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06/gay_conversion_therapy_fraud_trial_verdict.html 
[http://perma.cc/7U33-JHQB]. 
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with assurances of scientifically based treatment and guarantees of a 
specific cure rate; Downing then “treated” them through quack science and 
talk therapy that blamed the victims’ parents for causing their 
homosexuality. 
On June 25, 2015, after a three-week trial, the jury needed only three 
hours to deliberate before returning a unanimous verdict in favor of the 
plaintiffs.7 One juror said that the decision was “cut and dried”: the JONAH 
program was not therapy.8 It was unconscionable consumer fraud. In 
addition to this first-in-the-nation verdict, a pretrial ruling by the Court 
declared—for the first time in American history9—that homosexuality was 
not a mental disease, disorder, or equivalent thereof as a matter of law.10 
These twin developments, an evidentiary ruling acknowledging the 
near universal consensus of the medical community that homosexuality is a 
normal variant of human sexuality and a jury verdict declaring attempts to 
change sexual orientation through pseudoscientific “therapies” to be 
unconscionable consumer fraud, have the capacity to deal a coup de grace 
to the remaining providers of conversion therapy in the United States. 
Of course, one state trial court decision in New Jersey creates neither 
binding precedent nor guaranteed success in future suits against conversion 
therapists. The case, however, was envisioned as—and is—a powerful 
model to consider in building future lawsuits. Conversion therapy enjoys 
few remaining supporters in the United States, and those supporters 
populate a closed universe of clinics, private practices, referral 
organizations, and resource groups that all draw on the same bad science 
and the same shoddy justifications for their work. The practice depends on 
certain misrepresentations very similar to the misrepresentations made by 
JONAH, its co-directors, and its chief therapist. These similarities and 
close relationships between and among providers make JONAH a model 
for holding conversion therapists accountable under state consumer fraud 
laws—a blueprint for a state-level litigation campaign aimed at revealing 
conversion therapy’s pervasive falsehoods.11 
 
7 Erik Eckholm, In a First, New Jersey Jury Says Group Selling Gay Cure Committed Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/nyregion/new-jersey-jury-says-group-
selling-gay-cure-committed-fraud.html [http://perma.cc/4RL5-8JAF]; Sam Wolfe, Op-Ed: Gay-
Conversion Therapy Should Be Exposed for What It Is, Consumer Fraud, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 29, 
2015, 3:00 PM) http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/2883953-155/op-ed-gay-conversion-therapy-should-be-
exposed [http://perma.cc/JA8F-NBZC]. 
8 Equality Case Files (@EQCF), TWITTER (June 25, 2015, 1:44 PM), 
https://twitter.com/EQCF/status/614172219481137152 [https://perma.cc/SB9Q-JPW6]. 
9 New Jersey Judge Rules Conversion Therapy Group Can’t Claim Homosexuality Is a Disorder, S. 
POVERTY L. CENTER (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2015/02/10/new-jersey-judge-
rules-conversion-therapy-group-can%E2%80%99t-claim-homosexuality-disorder 
[https://perma.cc/A39K-K328]. 
10 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. 
L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 10, 2015). 
11 Cf. Wolfe, supra note 7 (calling on remaining conversion therapy providers to “come clean” as 
to the nature of their services as consumer fraud). 
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Part I of this Essay draws on the trial transcripts and pretrial briefing 
in JONAH to argue that it is extraordinarily difficult—especially in a post-
JONAH world—to sell conversion therapy without simultaneously 
committing consumer fraud. Part II analyzes consumer protection laws in 
all fifty states to demonstrate the opportunities for and obstacles to 
deploying the JONAH model across the country. Part III discusses the 
merits of using litigation as a tool for curbing conversion therapy in the 
United States.  
I. UNIVERSALIZING JONAH’S FACTS: THE PREDICATE LIES OF 
CONVERSION THERAPY 
In inducing potential clients to purchase its therapy programs, JONAH 
violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), which prohibits the 
“act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial 
practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [or] 
misrepresentation . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any 
merchandise . . . .”12 
The plaintiffs identified six individual misrepresentations made by 
JONAH in selling its services: 
 
1. Homosexuality is a mental disease, disorder, or equivalent thereof; 
2. Homosexuality can be cured; 
3. The JONAH Program specifically could cure that illness; 
4. The JONAH Program had a specific rate of success; 
5. The JONAH Program worked in a specified time frame; 
6. The JONAH Program was based on science.13 
 
While certain of these misrepresentations were case-specific, the six 
distill down to two core misrepresentations that must be made, in some 
form or another, in any sale or provision of conversion therapy. These core 
misrepresentations are: 
 
1. Homosexuality is not a normal variant of human sexuality, but is 
instead a disease, disorder, or equivalent thereof; and 
2. Homosexuality can be changed through treatment. 
 
These core misrepresentations work together to justify the peddling of 
conversion therapy. JONAH told both of these lies to the plaintiffs 
 
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c. 115) (emphasis added) 
[http://perma.cc/N8EC-6R9M]. “Merchandise” includes services as well as goods, and embraces 
“anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” Id. § 56:8-1(c) (West, Westlaw through 
L.2015, c. 115) [http://perma.cc/6CVT-A462]. 
13 Plaintiffs’ Trial Memorandum at 11–18, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. Apr. 27, 2015). 
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explicitly and repeatedly through email communications, which made for 
powerful evidence.14 But a suit does not need a smoking gun 
communication to demonstrate the core misrepresentations; both 
misrepresentations are made simply by selling the service. 
First, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate a medical–
corrective connotation from the concept of therapy. Therapy is “treatment 
especially of [a] bodily, mental, or behavioral disorder.”15 By holding 
themselves out as therapists that can administer treatment capable of 
ridding patients of something unwanted, even without using the precise 
word “disorder,” therapists claim they can cure patients. Furthermore, the 
treatments offered by conversion therapists seek to eliminate a patient’s 
homosexuality by addressing its purported underlying causes, such as 
“shame about the body”16 and unresolved “childhood and adolescent 
wounds.”17 This pseudomedical terminology suggests that homosexuality is 
a symptom, a rash that will dissipate upon application of an appropriate 
ointment. It follows that therapists are selling a cure for an ailment; 
homosexuality is that ailment; and homosexuality is abnormal. 
The second core misrepresentation is the backbone of all conversion 
therapy, and even more essential to its sale than the first. Conversion 
therapists must, as a predicate to selling their services, assert that their 
treatment program is capable of changing one’s sexual orientation. That is, 
after all, the point of the entire enterprise. And unlike “pray away the gay” 
organizations that explicitly rely on the power of faith to “heal” 
homosexuality, or support groups designed to help gay men live celibate 
lives in conformity with their religious values,18 conversion therapy is 
billed as a scientific, therapeutic process by which a person’s sexual 
orientation can change from gay to straight. There simply is no conversion 
therapy without the possibility for conversion. 
Even in a hypothetical where a conversion therapist told his client, “I 
have absolutely no idea whether homosexuality is normal or abnormal; all I 
know is that my program can change your sexual orientation,” both core 
 
14 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 25, 2015) (“[S]ame-sex attraction (SSA) is just a SYMPTOM of underlying pain from unresolved 
childhood wounds.”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 14, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. June 25, 2015) (“The simple answer is, ‘yes, it’s possible to actually be fully rid of SSA.’”). 
15 Therapy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/therapy (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) [http://perma.cc/22FP-FFTH]; see also, e.g., 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. 09-5675, 2010 WL 3620203, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 
2010) (“Medical dictionaries define ‘therapy’ as the ‘treatment of disease.’”) [http://perma.cc/BY5K-
NTBH]. 
16 Transcript of Trial at 241–42, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 11, 2015). 
17 Id. at 38.  
18 See, e.g., JOEL 2:25 INT’L, http://www.joel225.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“As a Christian 
community, we proactively engage and affirm men and women throughout the world who experience 
same-sex attraction, providing ongoing prayerful support that encourages relational healing, sexual 
sobriety, and spiritual growth.”) [http://perma.cc/WJ4G-HCAJ]. 
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misrepresentations are present. The second certainly has been made: the 
therapist has promised his program can work. The first has been made as 
well: conversion therapy views homosexuality as symptomatic, caused by 
certain underlying psychological issues to be addressed through a 
therapeutic program. The sale of this program is also the sale of this 
model—the moment a conversion therapist actually begins therapy and 
asks about a client’s relationship with his mother, or about his relationship 
with his peer group, or whether he was sexually abused as a child, he has 
pathologized homosexuality as an aberration caused by those “wounds.” 
An assumption of abnormality proceeds from the course of treatment, even 
if the therapist is exactingly careful never to describe homosexuality itself 
as disordered.19 
Not all therapy aimed at assisting the religious conservative LGBT 
population, of course, qualifies as conversion therapy. A therapist might 
offer services not intended to “change” one’s homosexuality, but instead 
intended to reduce the intensity of an individual’s perceived attractions, or 
to teach coping mechanisms designed to enable a patient to live a chaste 
lifestyle in alignment with his religious beliefs. While one may wish (and 
work) for a world where no individual felt compelled to reject his or her 
innate sexuality in order to comply with religious dogma, these services 
can be and are provided in a respectful, healthy manner,20 and are not aimed 
at “converting” individuals from gay to straight. However, while 
individuals should be free to prioritize their religious beliefs and seek to 
live in accordance with those beliefs, this does not permit others to lie to 
them while selling services designed to assist in that prioritization. 
Consumer fraud laws reject such a stark notion of caveat emptor—
sometimes explicitly.21 If therapy is intended to reduce or eliminate an 
individual’s SSA and/or increase his OSA, if it is designed or marketed to 
“convert” that individual from gay to straight, both core misrepresentations 
I describe below must have been made to the patient as a matter of logic. 
 
19 Should a therapist tell a potential client that homosexuality is entirely normal, but still offer 
services purporting to change one’s sexual orientation, the second core misrepresentation is certainly 
present—that therapist is promising a result he cannot deliver. Proving the first core misrepresentation 
would be more difficult, but still possible; a plaintiff would need to demonstrate that statements made to 
him during the course of treatment pathologized homosexuality by keying it to any of the major 
“causes” of homosexuality posited by conversion therapists (such as a masculinity deficit, or childhood 
sexual trauma, or the “triadic family” described infra note 26 and accompanying text). Even if the first 
core misrepresentation has not been made, however, the second certainly has—and it takes only one 
misrepresentation to violate consumer fraud laws. 
20 Consider for example a therapist who, while confirming to his clients that homosexuality is a 
perfectly normal variant of human sexuality, works to reduce feelings of shame and stigma attached to a 
patient’s orientation and, if the patient wishes, helps him create healthy coping mechanisms so he can 
conform his sexual behavior to his religious beliefs. Critically, the ill sought to be corrected by this 
form of therapy is the discomfort the patient experiences due to the conflict between his sexual 
orientation and his religion, not the orientation itself. 
21 See, e.g., NEW JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGE 4.43: CONSUMER FRAUD ACT at 2 (2011), 
available at https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/charges/4.43.pdf (“Many of us have heard the Latin 
phrase caveat emptor: ‘let the buyer beware.’ That statement allows little relief to a customer. That 
statement does not reflect current law in New Jersey. Here, we have a more ethical approach in business 
dealings with one another.”) [https://perma.cc/AUG2-9N65]. 
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Over the course of the JONAH trial, both of these essential, core 
misrepresentations were proven to be fraudulent misrepresentations of fact.  
A. Homosexuality Is Abnormal 
Arthur Goldberg gave the same pitch to each of the plaintiffs in the 
JONAH case, a pitch he’d given hundreds of times.22 There was no such 
thing as homosexuality, he said; the mainstream media and radical gay 
activists created the term. Homosexuality is just a symptom of childhood 
wounds inflicted by the parents, he explained, that resolves itself if 
addressed in therapy. “JONAH’s Psycho-Educational Model for Healing 
Homosexuality,” posted on the JONAH website, went so far as to invent a 
term for homosexuality: “Same-Sex Attraction Disorder.”23 
JONAH’s position is consistent with the discredited model for 
homosexuality articulated by Dr. Joseph Nicolosi, one of the fathers of 
modern conversion therapy24 and one of its most vocal proponents.25 The 
“triadic family” model of an overbearing mother, distant father, and 
sensitive child26 is not the only “cause” of homosexuality subscribed to by 
conversion therapists, but it is one of the most popular.27 It is also 
remarkably flexible: Michael Ferguson, the named plaintiff in the JONAH 
case, testified that his therapy with Alan Downing focused on identifying 
examples of his father’s failings and his mother’s overprotectiveness, 
especially in the beginning.28 Many of these issues, like a father being away 
 
22 Transcript of Trial at 86, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 8, 
2015). 
23 Elaine Silodor Berk & Arthur A. Goldberg, JONAH’s Psycho-Educational Model for Healing 
Homosexuality, JONAH INT’L, http://jonahweb.org/library_article/view/jonah-39-s-psycho-educational-
model-for-healing-homosexuality.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“There is no ‘magic bullet’ for 
healing even though it is frequently wished for by those suffering from a same-sex attraction disorder 
(SSAD).”) [http://perma.cc/3W6A-R5VT]. 
24 See Finding a Counselor or Life Coach: David H. Pickup, MA, LMFT, PEOPLE CAN CHANGE, 
http://www.peoplecanchange.com/support/counselor.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“David underwent 
an extensive internship and training with the creator of Reparative Therapy, Dr. Joseph Nicolosi at 
Thomas Aquinas Psychological Clinic.”) [http://perma.cc/4RB2-UDLX]. 
25 See, e.g., Joseph Nicolosi, What Is Reparative Therapy? Examining the Controversy, JOSEPH 
NICOLOSI PH.D., http://www.josephnicolosi.com/what-is-reparative-therapy-exa/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015) (detailing Nicolosi’s theory of homosexuality and program for treatment) [http://perma.cc/8FFX-
K7XN]. 
26 See Joseph Nicolosi, Attachment Loss and Grief Work in Reparative Therapy, JOSEPH NICOLOSI 
PH.D., http://www.josephnicolosi.com/attachment-loss-and-grief-work/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) 
(detailing the “triadic narcissistic family” model and claiming it contributes to the development of 
homosexuality in males) [http://perma.cc/L3YB-2N9A]. 
27 It is also completely unscientific. “There are no empirical studies or peer-reviewed research that 
support theories attributing same-sex sexual orientation to family dysfunction or trauma.” AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON 
APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 54 (2009), available at 
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXY8-Q2HE]. 
28 Transcript of Trial at 220–23, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 16, 2015). Downing’s treatment notes for Mr. Ferguson include entire sessions examining “What 
didn’t I get from Dad” and hypothetical questions from Michael to his mother along these same lines. 
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 433 at 6, 10, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25, 
2015). 
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for work or a mother enrolling him in extracurricular activities, seem like 
perfectly natural components of life in a typical middle-class American 
nuclear family. But in the hands of Downing, these childhood memories 
were twisted into a narrative of Ferguson’s parents “causing” his 
homosexuality. 
In JONAH, the battle over this misrepresentation was largely fought 
and won in expert discovery. JONAH proffered six experts: four 
conversion therapists (including Dr. Nicolosi), one medical doctor, and one 
rabbi. All four therapists submitted reports claiming, among other things, 
that homosexuality is a learned response to childhood “wounds” and is 
addressable through therapy aimed at resolving those wounds. They argued 
that this school of thought, while unpopular, presented a coherent argument 
for homosexuality as a learned or acquired disorder, or at least not as a 
normal variant of human sexuality. Each of these individuals failed to 
qualify as experts under New Jersey law, and each was excluded.29 
New Jersey is a Frye state.30 As such, the reliability of proffered 
expert testimony can be proven by showing its “general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.”31 The Court, in its ruling excluding 
JONAH’s experts, declared that “[t]he overwhelming weight of scientific 
authority concludes that homosexuality is not a disorder or abnormal. The 
universal acceptance of that scientific conclusion—save for outliers such as 
JONAH—requires that any expert opinions to the contrary must be 
barred.”32 
This statement is not controversial. In 1973, the American Psychiatric 
Association removed homosexuality per se from the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,33 the standard desk reference for 
psychiatrists in the United States.34 Since then, the pattern has been 
 
29 Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
30 I note that proffered conversion therapy experts excluded under Frye are likely to be excluded 
under the Daubert standard as well. Daubert requires judges to determine whether a proffered expert’s 
opinion is based on a valid, scientific methodology. Under this standard, the factors that may be 
considered in determining whether an expert’s methodology is valid are: (1) whether the theory or 
technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and 
publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific community. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) 
[http://perma.cc/C6B2-CJKY]. A casual glance at the universally refuted, fringe nature of conversion 
therapy suggests it fails at least on factors (1), (2), and (5). 
31 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) [http://perma.cc/77R8-L8QQ]. 
32 Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
33 Position Statement (Retired), Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation 
Disturbance: Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, page 44, APA Document Reference No. 
730008 (Dec. 1973), available at http://www.torahdec.org/downloads/dsm-
ii_homosexuality_revision.pdf [http://perma.cc/YB85-5JS9]. 
34 Frequently Asked Questions, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT, 
http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/faq.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (“The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is the handbook used by health care professionals in the United 
States and much of the world as the authoritative guide to the diagnosis of mental disorders.”) 
[http://perma.cc/KU4A-KHUD]. 
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unbroken: each and every major medical and mental health association in 
the United States has concluded that homosexuality is a normal variant of 
human sexuality.35 In an amicus brief in United States v. Windsor, the 
American Psychological Association stated: 
For decades . . . the consensus of mental health professionals and researchers 
has been that homosexuality and bisexuality are normal expressions of human 
sexuality and pose no inherent obstacle to leading a happy, healthy, and 
productive life, and that gay and lesbian people function well in the full array 
of social institutions and interpersonal relationships.36 
JONAH pointed to the existence of certain niche groups advocating 
for a pathological understanding of homosexuality, most notably the 
National Association for the Research and Therapy of Homosexuality 
(NARTH),37 as proof that general acceptance of homosexuality as a normal 
variant of human sexuality did not exist.38 The Frye standard, however, 
does not require unanimity.39 As the Court stated, “a group of a few closely 
associated experts cannot incestuously validate one another as a means of 
establishing the reliability of their shared theories.”40 
In other words, the mere existence of a fringe viewpoint did not defeat 
the consensus of the wider medical and scientific community. After all, a 
discredited scientific theory is by definition unreliable, and “the theory that 
homosexuality is a disorder is not novel but—like the notion that the earth 
 
35 See, e.g., Barbara L. Frankowski et al., Sexual Orientation and Adolescents, 113 PEDIATRICS 
1827, 1827–28 (2004) [http://perma.cc/6A9Q-LCE5]; AMA Policies on LGBT Issues: Patient-Centered 
Policies: H-160.991 Health Care Needs of the Homosexual Population, AM. MED. ASS’N, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/glbt-advisory-
committee/ama-policy-regarding-sexual-orientation.page? (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (“Our AMA . . . 
opposes, the use of ‘reparative’ or ‘conversion’ therapy that is based upon the assumption that 
homosexuality per se is a mental disorder. . . .”) [http://perma.cc/N8SY-EGHB]; Appropriate 
Counseling Responses to Sexual Orientation, Am. Counseling Ass’n, ACA Governing Council Meeting 
Minutes, (March 26–27, 1998), available at http://www.counseling.org/Sub/Minutes/ 
Governing_Council/1998_0326.pdf (affirming that “homosexuality is not a mental disorder”) 
[http://perma.cc/32UZ-TMZS]; Position Statement, Royal Coll. of Psychiatrists, Royal College of 
Psychiatrists’ Statement on Sexual Orientation (Apr. 2014), available at 
https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/PS02_2014.pdf (“The College wishes to clarify that homosexuality is 
not a psychiatric disorder.”) [https://perma.cc/YHN9-GPC4]. 
36 See Brief of the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae on the Merits in 
Support of Affirmance at 8–9, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) (2013) 
[http://perma.cc/J8SL-ZS7V]. The brief was filed on behalf of the American Psychological Association, 
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric 
Association, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the California Medical Association, the 
National Association of Social Workers, and the New York State Psychological Association. 
37 NARTH was recently rebranded as the “clinical division” of the “Alliance for Therapeutic 
Choice and Scientific Integrity.” See NARTH INST., http://www.therapeuticchoice.com/#!narth-
institute/c1hul (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) [http://perma.cc/S2GS-QS9G]. 
38 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Experts at 10–11, Ferguson 
v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
39 See State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 950 (N.J. 1986) (holding general acceptance “does not depend 
on unanimous belief or universal agreement within the scientific community”) [http://perma.cc/LM9D-
5A7A]. 
40 Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
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is flat and the sun revolves around it—instead is outdated and refuted.”41 
JONAH’s experts were therefore excluded from testifying at trial.42 
In disposing of cross motions for summary judgment, and based on 
this previous evidentiary ruling, the court ruled that it was a 
misrepresentation in violation of the New Jersey CFA to state that 
homosexuality was not a normal variation of human sexuality, but was 
instead a mental illness, disorder, or equivalent thereof.43 The court held 
that homosexuality is not a sickness—as a matter of law. 
It is essential to understand the importance of this finding to the 
JONAH case, and to future cases built on the JONAH model. The plaintiffs’ 
main source of evidence in JONAH, beyond the testimony of the parties 
themselves, came from the JONAH email listserv, which functioned as a 
propaganda machine for the JONAH clinic.44 Other evidence available to 
prove the disease–disorder misrepresentation included marketing materials 
for group and individual therapy sessions, emails to potential clients off-
listserv, and communications between Goldberg, Berk, and other 
conversion therapy providers (among much else). Because the standard 
conversion therapy business model is based on the lie that homosexuality is 
abnormal, this lie—a lie as a matter of law—appeared everywhere in 
JONAH’s communications and operations. The same is likely true with 
other providers of the same service.45  
B. Homosexuality Can Be Changed Through Treatment 
The “JONAH Program” had three major components: (1) individual 
therapy with Alan Downing or another JONAH counselor; (2) group 
therapy sessions led by Downing or Goldberg at the JONAH offices in 
Jersey City; and (3) referrals for “Journey Into Manhood” weekend retreats 
run by another conversion therapy organization, People Can Change.46 The 
 
41 Id. at 25. 
42 Id. at 26, 31. 
43 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. 
L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 10, 2015). 
44 JONAH co-directors used the listserv to reinforce the message that their clients had a problem 
that needed to be solved. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 164 at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25, 2015) (“All men are born straight. They become SSA because of 
emotional wounds typically in childhood.”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 183, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-
12 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 25, 2015) (“JONAH is in big trouble with gay activists just because we say no 
one is born gay and people can change. These myths are what has convinced the public that 
homosexuality is normal and inborn . . . .”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 159 at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-
5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25, 2015) (“I’ve known . . . alcoholics who must have 3 drinks 
every night – but function OK in their lives. However, it doesn’t make their alcoholism or obesity good 
or normal. It’s the same with SSA.”). 
45 For example, The “International Healing Foundation,” a referral service linking potential clients 
with conversion therapists, prominently features “causes” of homosexuality including “Hetero-
Emotional Wounds,” “Body Image Wounds,” and “Sexual Abuse” on its website. Potential Causes of 
SSA, INT’L HEALING FOUND.: COMING OUT . . . LOVED, http://www.comingoutloved.com/causes-of-ssa 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2015) [http://perma.cc/AS3U-X42T]. 
46 See Transcript of Trial at 138–39, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 8, 2015). 
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JONAH Program, Goldberg assured his clients, had a two-in-three chance 
of success of changing their sexuality.47 
But JONAH kept no client records. There were no exit surveys, no 
follow-up questionnaires—no systematic communication of any kind with 
clients who had left the program.48 The statistics quoted by Goldberg were 
either entirely fictional or based on Goldberg’s own memories of past 
clients and selective recall of studies on the subject.49 
Studies that purport to show that homosexuality can be changed 
through conversion therapy and similar programs certainly exist.50 The 
American Psychological Association addressed those studies exhaustively 
in its 2009 publication, Report of the American Psychological Association 
Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation.51 
This report engaged in a systematic review of research on the efficacy of 
sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE), revealing “substantial 
deficiencies” in the studies claiming to demonstrate its efficacy.52 These 
deficiencies included lack of internal validity due to sample attrition and 
variability in outcome measures, small or skewed sample populations in 
recent studies containing only self-reports by religiously conservative adult 
males,53 and inappropriate selection and performance of statistical tests.54 
The Task Force concluded that, given the dearth of scientifically sound 
research, “claims that recent SOCE is effective are not supported.”55 Dr. 
Lee Beckstead, one of the authors of the Task Force Report, testified that 
none of the treatments JONAH employed were, or could be, effective at 
changing an individual’s sexual orientation.56 
In the course of its review, the Task Force also identified evidence that 
SOCE was, in fact, harmful.57 But whether or not current conversion 
 
47 Id. at 155. Or a “substantial” chance. Id. at 156. Or a 70 to 75% chance. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 
116 at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25, 2015). It depended on 
the day. 
48 Transcript of Trial at 158–59, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 8, 2015). 
49 See id. at 164–55 (describing books, studies, and a two-thirds success rate). 
50 See generally JAMES E. PHELAN, SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION CHANGE 
EFFORTS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2014) (collecting studies claiming to show positive 
outcomes from conversion therapy). I note that the author of this booklet, Dr. James Phelan, admitted in 
the course of the JONAH case that he did not test the validity of any of the studies cited in the text. See 
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Experts at 32, Ferguson v. 
JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). He was subsequently barred from 
testifying as an expert. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Expert Witnesses at 
2, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
51 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 27 (2009). 
52 Id. at 34, 39–40. 
53 Id. at 52. 
54 Id. at 34. 
55 Id. at 2. 
56 Transcript of Trial at 39–40, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 
16, 2015). 
57 Early SOCE included aversive techniques such as electroshock therapy; studies of these aversive 
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therapy techniques actively harm patients, the techniques themselves are 
considered unethical in the mental health field. At trial, Dr. Carol 
Bernstein, a past president of the American Psychiatric Association and 
director of the psychiatric residency program at New York University’s 
medical school, testified that major treatment methods in JONAH’s 
conversion therapy program—nudity in individual therapy, extended 
holding between therapist and client, re-creation of sexual abuse and other 
traumatic experiences, and anger transference exercises, among other 
things—were so far outside the ethical bounds of the psychiatric profession 
that, should one of Dr. Bernstein’s residents practice them, it would 
warrant disciplinary action up to and including expulsion.58 
Faced with expert testimony demonstrating that their science was 
flawed and that their methods were unethical, the defendants in JONAH 
turned to anecdotal evidence. They cited testimonials from clients—
including contemporaneous statements from the plaintiffs themselves—
saying they felt their SSA decreasing through treatment, and that they felt 
themselves becoming more attracted to women. Some of these clients 
declared that they thought various portions of the defendants’ program, 
including weekend retreats featuring extended “healthy touch” sessions and 
“guts work” like Benjy’s mother-beating session, were incredibly positive 
experiences.59 
Dr. Janja Lalich, a sociologist specializing in the study of coercive 
influence, testified as an expert for the plaintiffs. She explained that these 
sorts of affirmations, often made immediately after emotionally charged 
experiences, were expected.60 JONAH, and organizations like it, combined 
a closed philosophy with regular message reinforcement and targeted 
recruiting to coerce individuals into complying with its belief structure, 
even when the effects were harmful.61 
This pattern of coercive influence was clear at JONAH. The plaintiffs 
in JONAH were told the program worked—and that if it didn’t work, it was 
because they hadn’t worked hard enough to change.62 They were reminded, 
constantly, that being gay meant leading a lonely life ending in disease and 
early death.63 They came from religiously conservative environments in 
 
treatments showed high dropout rates and iatrogenic effects on patients. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
supra note 27, at 43 (2009). The Task Force found that recent research on nonaversive SOCE also 
included patient reports of perceived harm, though mixed with patient reports of perceived benefit. Id. 
58 Transcript of Trial at 175–78, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 10, 2015). 
59 See, e.g., Defendants’ Exhibit 29, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 25, 2015) (“I definitely felt like the energy at [Journey Into Manhood] was deeply healing for 
me . . . .”); Defendants’ Exhibit 78, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 
25, 2015) (“I miss the friendship [sic] the acceptance, the love, and I just miss all of you.”). 
60 Transcript of Trial at 167–68, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 15, 2015). 
61 Id. at 113–16. 
62 Transcript of Trial at 54–55, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 
11, 2015). 
63 Id. at 64–66. Indeed, the co-director of JONAH claimed that no gay couple had maintained, or 
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which homosexuality was not accepted. They were told they needed to 
“commit” to the work. In such a situation, Dr. Lalich explained, anyone 
would be expected to claim they felt the treatment was working—as failure 
was the individual’s fault, not the organization’s, and questioning that 
assumption could lead to removal from the group.64 But as Dr. Bernstein 
testified, just because a client says, or even thinks, a treatment is beneficial 
doesn’t mean it actually is beneficial.65 It can, in fact, be quite harmful—the 
“high” experienced by individuals caught in a system of coercive influence 
is generally followed by an emotional “crash.”66 
In a last-ditch effort to demonstrate that their treatments could work, 
the defense called seven “success story witnesses”: men who claimed to 
have successfully completed a course of conversion therapy. The first 
success story witness testified that though he was married and considered 
himself a success, he was still predominately attracted to men.67 Another 
testified that while he no longer considered himself to be gay, he did not 
experience sexual fantasies about women.68 The remaining “success 
stories” were similar; not one witness testified that he now experienced 
regular opposite-sex attraction. 
The risk of a future conversion therapist defendant finding better 
success stories is low. These witnesses were selected from a pool of 
approximately twenty of the best candidates from an initial pool of 
approximately one hundred volunteers, all past participants in People Can 
Change’s weekend conversion therapy retreats.69 These were, in other 
words, the best “success” stories available. 
In order to demonstrate the misrepresentation that homosexuality is 
curable through treatment, a future plaintiff would only need to show that 
his therapist asserted that the program was effective. From there, a lack of 
scientific and anecdotal proof demonstrates the statement is at best 
misleading and at worst false. Even if the therapist in question maintains 
client records purporting to show that certain of his clients have self-
reported as “successful,” further investigation of these “success stories” 
may well reveal that the clients self-reporting success are using an unusual 
 
could maintain, a monogamous relationship for more than five years. Id. at 64. 
64 Transcript of Trial at 260–61, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 15, 2015). 
65 Transcript of Trial at 174–75, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 10, 2015). 
66 Transcript of Trial at 167, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 
15, 2015). 
67 Transcript of Trial at 210, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 17, 2015). 
This man was also the sitting Chairman of the Board of Directors of North Star International, a major 
conversion therapy resource organization, at the time of trial. Id. at 203. 
68 Transcript of Trial at 21–23, 38, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 18, 2015). The witness explained that his goal was not to sexually fanaticize about women, as it 
was not consistent with his religious values. Id. at 38. 
69 See Transcript of Trial at 101, 194, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. June 24, 2015). 
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definition of the term, similar to the “success story witnesses” in JONAH. 
Such stories reveal that the only impact of conversion therapy is a shallow 
ability to reclaim the title of “straight” while experiencing no authentic 
change in sexual attraction. 
Conversion therapy does not work because conversion therapy cannot 
work, in the sense that it cannot “cure” homosexuality. This core 
misrepresentation is made every time a conversion therapist accepts 
payment for “treatment” and every time a therapist provides so-called 
“therapy.” 
II. PROJECTING JONAH NATIONWIDE: A SURVEY OF STATE 
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 
Having demonstrated the fallacies of the two core misrepresentations 
in JONAH that are commonly present in the sale and provision of 
conversion therapy, I turn to analyze the state-level consumer protection 
laws that makes those misrepresentations illegal. Every state has passed a 
consumer protection law and granted private citizens the right to enforce 
the law through a civil cause of action.70 While New Jersey’s CFA is 
particularly plaintiff-friendly, a nationwide survey of other states’ 
consumer protection laws reveals there are many other jurisdictions where 
a JONAH-modeled case could easily be brought. 
A. The New Jersey Model 
The New Jersey CFA offered a potent mix of incentives for bringing 
an experimental suit against a conversion therapist. Four features of the 
New Jersey CFA are particularly salient here: (1) lack of an intent or 
knowledge requirement on the part of defendants, (2) lack of a reliance 
requirement on the part of plaintiffs, (3) availability of equitable relief, and 
(4) availability of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Additionally, a 
prima facie case under the CFA consists of only three elements: (1) 
unlawful conduct, (2) ascertainable loss by the defendant, and (3) a causal 
relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.71 “An 
intent to deceive is not a prerequisite to the imposition of liability.”72 The 
New Jersey CFA “is designed to protect the public even when a merchant 
acts in good faith.”73 Perhaps most importantly, a potential plaintiff need 
not prove she relied on the unlawful conduct, merely that the conduct 
occurred and caused harm. “A practice can be unlawful even if no person 
 
70 See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, STATE 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION PRELIMINARY 
REPORT 53–55 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708175. 
71 See Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 964 A.2d 741, 749 (N.J. 2009) [http://perma.cc/W7NN-
PCC5]. 
72 Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 365 (N.J. 1997) [http://perma.cc/K4TF-6Z4P]. 
73 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 461 (N.J. 1994) [http://perma.cc/DM6U-5C97]. 
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was in fact misled or deceived thereby.”74 This broad cause of action, 
combined with the availability of trebled compensatory damages,75 
attorney’s fees,76 and toothy equitable relief77 makes New Jersey’s CFA one 
of the broadest, and most protective, in the country. Each of the four 
features that make the New Jersey CFA so attractive will be discussed in 
turn below. 
First, consumer fraud laws that do not require demonstrating that the 
defendant either knew or intended his actions to be fraudulent are 
especially important in the conversion therapy context, where religious 
beliefs and pseudoscientific “evidence” are never far from the “treatment” 
room. Such laws eliminate the “true believer” problem, which arises when 
conversion therapists can say they disagree with prevailing science and 
believe their practices work in an attempt to shield themselves from 
consumer fraud liability. 
Second, the absence of a reliance requirement opens the world of 
evidence available to a plaintiff to prove his claim to all salient 
misrepresentations made by the defendant, rather than limiting available 
evidence to examples of misrepresentations made directly to the plaintiff. 
As described above, conversion therapists typically build their businesses 
on twin lies that permeate their communications and treatment programs. 
While therapists typically make these two lies to individual plaintiffs in the 
course of selling their services, a plaintiff bringing a claim in a non-reliance 
jurisdiction will also be able to offer other examples of defendants making 
these lies—a wide array of evidence which, in JONAH, proved 
overwhelming. 
Third, every state’s consumer fraud regime provides for the 
application of equitable relief to enjoin the continuance of a fraud on the 
public.78 This power is vested in the attorney general of the state, and often 
extended to a citizen bringing a private right of action. In New Jersey, for 
example, a private citizen is able to seek injunctive relief in addition to 
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, which is valuable because it 
allows the reach of a private lawsuit to go far beyond simple monetary 
damages: a victim can enjoin a conversion therapist from continuing to 
perpetrate fraud on the public in the same courtroom, without having to 
seek redress through the state attorney general. In JONAH, that meant a 
permanent injunction requiring the clinic to close its doors forever, and 
prohibiting the therapists employed by JONAH from ever practicing 
 
74 Id. at 462. 
75 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c. 115) [http://perma.cc/D76P-
7TAP]. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. § 56:8-8 (granting individuals, in addition to the attorney general, the power to seek equitable 
relief in a private cause of action for consumer fraud, in addition to the attorney general) 
[http://perma.cc/6HPZ-3ZTC]. 
78 See Appendix. 
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conversion therapy again.79 
Fourth, the availability of attorney’s fees makes private actions 
possible where they might not otherwise be. JONAH, as an anecdotal 
example, required over thirty fact depositions, seven expert depositions, 
several rounds of motions to dismiss and summary judgment briefing, and 
a three-week trial. This is enormously expensive. The jury’s awards for 
compensatory damages, on the other hand, were relatively small, ranging 
from several hundred dollars to just over $17,000.80 Providing for 
attorney’s fees makes this protracted litigation feasible for plaintiffs and 
their lawyers—and provides a further monetary penalty against defendant 
therapists when the plaintiffs prevail. 
While New Jersey’s CFA made the state a favorable incubator for a 
consumer fraud case against conversion therapists, it is not the only nest in 
the tree. Many jurisdictions offer similar core protections to the New Jersey 
CFA, such that victims of conversion therapists would be able to structure a 
claim similar to the one in JONAH. Other states’ statutory regimes may 
differ from New Jersey’s by requiring either reliance or a showing of 
intent. Though these heightened burdens are inconvenient in proving the 
fraud of conversion therapy, they are not insurmountable. And while a 
limited number of states have restrictive consumer protection laws that 
would make a JONAH-model suit difficult, these outliers are vastly 
outnumbered by jurisdictions where conversion therapy is more vulnerable 
to attack than ever before. 
What follows is a fifty-state survey of state consumer protection laws. 
All states make available a private cause of action. The survey focuses on 
how closely the laws conform to New Jersey on the four above-stated 
features of nonreliance, nonintent, equitable relief, and attorney’s fees. 
Details on each state, including specific statutory references and citations to 
relevant case law, are available in the Appendix to this Essay. 
B. Copycat Jurisdictions 
Several state CFAs match the New Jersey CFA on all four critical 
metrics: lack of an intent requirement, lack of a reliance requirement, 
availability of equitable relief, and availability of attorney’s fees. These 
states are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas,81 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, 
 
79 See Press Release, Southern Poverty Law Center, Groundbreaking SPLC Lawsuit Forces New 
Jersey Group to Cease Bogus ‘Conversion Therapy’ Program, Pay Damages (Dec. 18, 2015), available 
at https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/121815_jonah_settlement_press_release_final.pdf 
[perma.cc/2RBN-BDK4]. 
80 Jury Verdict Sheet at 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 25, 2015). 
81 The general prohibition of deceptive acts and practices at Kan. Stat. § 50-626(a) does not require 
intent; however, many of the specific prohibitions at § 50-626(b) do. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) [http://perma.cc/285J-SFP6]. Conversion therapy services fall 
under the general prohibition against deceptive acts and practices; I therefore include Kansas as a 
copycat jurisdiction for this specific purpose.  The same holds true for Illinois, Michigan, and Oregon.  
110:77 (2015) The Ferguson v. JONAH Verdict 
93 
Vermont, and Washington. 
C. Requiring Reliance: An Evidentiary Problem and Solution 
Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming have imposed 
a reliance requirement on consumer fraud plaintiffs, either in the statute 
itself or in subsequent state court decisions.82 It is, however, impossible to 
state with certainty that these are the only states that would require a civil 
plaintiff to show that she relied on the statements made by the defendant to 
prove a consumer fraud claim because many state CFA statutes are silent as 
to reliance and the courts in those states have yet to address the question 
directly.83 
While a complete review of the reliance requirements in each state is 
beyond the scope of this Essay, an example analysis applying JONAH’s 
facts in a state with a reliance requirement demonstrates how the additional 
hurdle of proving reliance might be overcome. 
Georgia’s courts have read a reliance requirement into the state’s 
consumer fraud law.84 This requirement mandates that “a claimant who 
alleges [Georgia’s consumer protection law] was violated as the result of a 
misrepresentation must demonstrate that he was injured as the result of the 
reliance upon the alleged misrepresentation.”85 
In JONAH, where there was no reliance requirement, the plaintiffs 
needed only to show JONAH made misrepresentations and that the 
plaintiffs suffered ascertainable loss. This opened the door to evidence of 
communications between the defendants and non-party clients. The 
plaintiffs were not privy to such communications in purchasing JONAH’s 
services, and thus the communications could not have served as the basis of 
their decision to purchase the defendants’ services. 
This sort of evidence would be irrelevant in a JONAH-modeled case in 
Georgia, as the specific misrepresentations must be tied to the plaintiff’s 
decision to purchase the service. But the requirement does not defeat the 
claim. It merely restricts the acceptable evidence available for proving it. 
While the plaintiffs in JONAH had access to a veritable bounty of emails 
and advertisements from the defendants to a variety of third parties which 
could be used to prove the defendants misrepresented their services, they 
also had sufficient evidence of the misrepresentations as delivered to the 
plaintiffs personally: email messages between plaintiff and defendant, 
intake questionnaires for their therapist, applications to weekend retreats, 
 
82 See Appendix. 
83 See Appendix. 
84 See Tiismann v. Linda Martin Holmes Corp., 637 S.E.2d 14, 16–17 (Ga. 2006) (citing Zeeman v. 
Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) [http://perma.cc/9PKG-E2UZ]) 
[http://perma.cc/U8HP-ZRZT]. 
85 Zeeman, 273 S.E.2d at 916. 
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and their own direct testimony. In a situation where potential plaintiffs 
have retained neither paperwork nor email records from their entire courses 
of therapy, their own oral testimony to the fact that the misrepresentations 
were made to them and the fact that they purchased services will still be 
available in making out their claims. 
Certain potential plaintiffs may face specific factual difficulties in 
proving reliance. One JONAH plaintiff, for example, was in medical school 
during his course of therapy, and had significant experience with 
conversion therapists before he came to JONAH.86 Had the plaintiffs been 
forced to show that he relied on the defendants’ misrepresentations in 
electing to purchase treatment from JONAH, the defendants would have 
had colorable arguments that a future medical doctor who had been 
exposed to the defendants’ theories many times before could not 
reasonably rely on the defendants’ pseudoscientific assertions as to their 
program’s efficacy. Should similar situations arise in future cases, 
testimony from experts such as Dr. Lalich on the psychology of coercive 
influence may help a jury determine what is “reasonable reliance” in the 
context of a sheltered, conservative religious community—but there are 
admittedly no guarantees. Requiring plaintiffs to show they relied on the 
bald-faced lies of a conversion therapist complicates their claims, but does 
not necessarily make such claims impossible. 
D. Requiring Intent: Dealing With True Believers 
Certain state CFAs, such as Kansas’s, require that the defendant either 
knew or should have known their statements were deceptive.87 JONAH, 
however, provides a clear route for meeting the knowledge requirement in 
Kansas and similar states. As the court pointed out in excluding JONAH’s 
experts, the evidence is “overwhelming” that homosexuality is a normal 
variant of human sexuality.88 The plaintiffs also demonstrated through 
experts and evidence that there is no science supporting the notion that 
therapies designed to change an individual’s sexual orientation are 
effective. Conversion therapists operating today, therefore, should know, at 
least, that when they make either of the core misrepresentations, their 
statements are considered false by the vast majority of the scientific 
community. 
A small number of states—Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming—impose 
either intent or knowledge requirements in their general prohibitions of 
prohibited acts under their consumer fraud laws.89 In this most restrictive 
 
86 Transcript of Trial at 209–10, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 16, 2015). 
87 See Appendix. 
88 Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
89 See Appendix. Several other states require a showing of intent in cases of omission or 
concealment of a material fact, or require intent under specific prohibitions irrelevant to the sale of 
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scenario, theoretical plaintiffs could argue that defendants made a 
statement knowing that there is a general consensus in the medical 
community that their statements are false. Furthermore, plaintiffs could 
show that therapist defendants intended potential clients to rely on their 
statements, rather than the generally accepted opinion of the medical 
community. Whether this misdirection can cross the line into knowingly 
making a prohibited misrepresentation will be a question of law for the 
courts of these few restrictive states. 
I do not minimize the difficulty an intent requirement presents in those 
few states where it does exist. Demonstrating that conversion therapists 
know they are lying will not be easy. But the overwhelming weight of 
scientific evidence, as synthesized in JONAH, creates a platform to argue 
that therapists in these states knew that they could not support their 
representations that homosexuality is abnormal and treatable with credible 
evidence. The last logical step from there to intentional misrepresentation 
belongs to future judges and juries. 
E. Problem Jurisdictions 
Certain outlier states’ consumer protection regimes raise questions 
about their ability to sustain a JONAH-model suit against conversion 
therapists not because of some specific protection for the services in 
question, but because of specific provisions that may present obstacles to 
rigorously protecting victims of conversion therapy within the jurisdiction. 
Luckily, these problem jurisdictions are few in number. 
Public Impact Requirements: Seven states—Colorado, Georgia, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina, and Washington—
require a plaintiff in a consumer fraud action to prove not only that they 
were defrauded, but also that the enterprise in question impacts the 
marketplace or the public at large.90 The precise contours of this burden 
vary from state to state and are outside the scope of this Essay; the nature 
of conversion therapy, however, makes this additional burden less onerous 
than in other cases where a business sells a legitimate product to a single 
plaintiff in a fraudulent manner. Conversion therapists, as described in 
Section II, use two core misrepresentations to defraud their clients. While 
state-by-state requirements for showing a public impact may differ slightly, 
the fraud inherent in conversion therapy affects the entire class of 
individuals who purchase the service, regardless of the source of the 
 
conversion therapy. See id. 
90 See Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 149 (Colo. 
2003) [http://perma.cc/VGH8-34VB]; Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 571 S.E.2d 454, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) 
[http://perma.cc/9JC9-4Y9U]; Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 313 (Minn. 2000) 
[http://perma.cc/LD88-N5NU]; Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 141–42 (Neb. 
2000) [http://perma.cc/Q44T-REGX]; Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 49 (S.C. 
1996) [http://perma.cc/8AJ4-48XN]; Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland 
Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) [https://perma.cc/M2SS-XZZ6]; Hangman Ridge Training 
Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 537 (Wash. 1986) [http://perma.cc/L7LH-LMAR]. 
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therapy or the method of its delivery. Therefore, while it may complicate a 
future JONAH-model suit, a public impact requirement does not necessitate 
failure. 
Attorney’s Fees: Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming do not allow plaintiffs to collect attorney’s fees in consumer 
fraud actions.91 North Dakota and Ohio only allow plaintiffs to collect 
attorney’s fees if they prove the defendants knowingly violated the law.92 
This is a serious bar to plaintiff recovery. The defendants’ attorneys’ fees in 
JONAH ran into the several millions of dollars—and, because defendants 
do not bear the burden of proof in consumer fraud actions, this figure will 
likely be higher for plaintiffs than for therapist defendants as a systematic 
matter.93 
Furthermore, a number of states employ statutory schema that force 
consumers in failed actions to pay some or all of the defendants’ attorney’s 
fees—typically in cases the court determines to be frivolous or cases filed 
to create a competitive business advantage.94 Without an incentive to 
represent clients who may have relatively small claims for compensatory 
damages,95 plaintiffs may be hard-pressed to find lawyers willing to take on 
their cases in the first place.96 And with the threat of paying defendants’ 
attorney’s fees in case of defeat, plaintiffs may be scared away from the 
enterprise altogether. A judgment for millions of dollars in fees is also a 
powerful hammer, capable of driving a conversion therapist out of the 
market altogether. Depriving plaintiffs of this weapon seriously diminishes 
the impact of any individual suit against any individual therapist. 
While these heightened burdens and monetary barriers complicate 
efforts to bring future JONAH-model cases, they exist in a minority of 
states. In most others, the path is open for future plaintiffs and their lawyers 
to bring suits against conversion therapists—and win. 
III. TOWARDS A NATIONAL CESSATION OF CONVERSION THERAPY 
Having addressed the “could,” I wish to spend a few moments on the 
somewhat trickier “should.” The remaining conversion therapists in the 
 
91 See Appendix. 
92 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-15-09 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
[http://perma.cc/S52G-SVXH]. 
93 See Christopher Doyle, Judicial Liberal Bias Forces Jury to Convict JONAH in Trial with Deep 
Ramifications, THE CHRISTIAN POST (July 6, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/ 
judicial-liberal-bias-forces-jury-to-convict-jonah-in-trial-with-deep-ramifications-141221 
[http://perma.cc/6RTV-RS4X]. 
94  See Appendix. 
95 For example, the JONAH judgment totaled just over $70,000 after statutory trebling. 
96 This is not to say that there are not incredible nonprofit organizations, such as the Southern 
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and Lambda Legal, which operate in the LGBT rights space and might 
take on a conversion therapy case notwithstanding the lack of attorney’s fees. The JONAH legal team 
was composed of the SPLC and two law firms working pro bono, and the team incurred millions of 
dollars of fees between the three firms. That level of financial commitment is to be commended, but the 
availability of attorney’s fees makes it possible to bring these sorts of cases without requiring the 
unlimited pro bono commitment of two major law firms. 
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United States are vulnerable to state-level consumer fraud claims 
nationwide. With the proper resources, and the proper plaintiffs, litigation 
could drive them out of business altogether. But should it? What is the best 
way to go about encouraging a final end to this practice—through further 
litigation, or through legislative action? Is some remnant practice 
acceptable? Or should the goal be to eradicate the practice entirely? 
The Southern Poverty Law Center’s LGBT Rights Project recently 
listed some seventy conversion therapy providers, referrers, and 
organizations still operating within the United States.97 This is a small 
number, all things considered—a testament to the nation’s rapidly evolving 
views of sexual orientation. 
The core misrepresentations described in this Essay—that 
homosexuality is both abnormal and changeable—are tactical positions of 
extreme importance in the anti-LGBT movement. If the thought leaders of 
this dying movement were to retreat from either of these two redoubts, they 
would surrender one of the last principled positions from which they can 
argue against extending equal rights to non-heterosexual individuals: the 
position that non-heterosexuality is demonstrably inferior to 
heterosexuality. To admit that homosexuality is neither a disease nor a 
mental disorder, and that it is not a condition subject to treatment and 
change, is to implicitly admit that the only basis for continued invectives 
against the LGBT community is not in science, but in bigotry—be it rooted 
in religious intolerance or irrational prejudice. 
This reality has had a galvanizing effect on the remaining purveyors of 
and hierophants for conversion therapy. In the JONAH case alone, the 
defense brought leaders from three other major conversion therapy 
associations (People Can Change, Northstar, and Joel 2:25) to testify on 
behalf of JONAH. These organizations are part of an ecosystem designed 
to maintain their perceived legitimacy—in their own eyes, arguably, as 
much as in others’—for as long as possible. Supporters manufacture 
“scientific studies” on sexual orientation through organizations like 
NARTH, publish these studies in the “peer reviewed” Journal of Human 
Sexuality (NARTH’s in-house publication, run by and for NARTH 
members),98 and use these results to justify the activities of their outward-
facing advocacy groups such as Voice of the Voiceless99 and Parents and 
 
97 See Conversion Therapy, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (July 3, 2015), 
http://splcenter.org/conversion-therapy 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150703163624/http://www.splcenter.org/conversion-therapy]. 
98 See Research Division Report, NARTH INST., http://www.narth.com/#!cv/cdy2 (last visited Nov. 
8, 2015) (inviting NARTH members to subscribe to and publish in the Journal of Human Sexuality) 
[http://perma.cc/5TJW-WX86]. 
99 See About Us, VOICE OF THE VOICELESS, http://www.voiceofthevoiceless.info/about-us/ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2015) (“We are forming an international coalition of former homosexuals, persons who 
experience unwanted SSA, and their families to fight against defamation and advance a positive image 
of the ex-gay community, their families, and the therapists and ministries who support them.”) 
[http://perma.cc/4DVC-DYZA]. 
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Friends of Ex-Gays and Gays.100 The leaders of these organizations use this 
junk science to argue against conversion therapy bans in state legislatures 
and defend the right to sell “therapy” services to vulnerable consumers.101 
These efforts occasionally find success. While certain states have banned 
the provision of conversion therapy to minors,102 many other proposed bans 
have failed to become law.103 Divided legislatures at the state and national 
level cannot be expected to put an end to this fraud. 
Accordingly, litigation continues to be the best route towards national 
cessation of conversion therapy. The science disproving its claimed 
efficacy is already solid. Litigation connects this evidence with real 
humans—real victims—and demonstrates the real harm these so-called 
“therapists” do to the patients who entrust themselves to their care. Making 
one’s case in a court of law and revealing this fraud to the communities that 
still support conversion therapy, especially conservative religious 
communities, serve an educative and reformative purpose. 
Just as critically, if and as the practice of conversion therapy comes to 
be seen less and less as a legal-if-distasteful choice for religious 
conservatives and more and more as an opportunistic fraud on sincerely 
religious individuals, politicians seeking to curb or ban the practice through 
legislative action gain political cover—and the calculus changes for 
politicians who would gladly defend a religious minority, but not a scam to 
defraud the same. In time, the need for litigation will likely lessen as 
legislative efforts gain momentum. 
The litigation strategy contemplated by this Essay does leave a safe 
harbor open to conversion therapists: free counseling provided by a 
nonprofit or a religious provider. Take for instance the organization Joel 
2:25. Jeremy Schwab, the founder of Joel 2:25 and a “success story 
witness” in the JONAH case, testified that he envisioned Joel 2:25 to be a 
“Christian version of JONAH.”104 In many ways this is indeed the case. 
Joel 2:25 runs online support groups for men and women whose religious 
beliefs conflict with their homosexuality, and these support groups engage 
in certain of the practices used by JONAH therapists.105 Critically, however, 
 
100 See Same Sex Attraction, PARENTS & FRIENDS OF EX-GAYS & GAYS, 
http://www.pfox.org/resources/same-sex-attraction/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (asserting that “we 
know . . . there is no ‘gay gene’” and change is possible.”) [http://perma.cc/DN4T-XDS2]. 
101 See Christopher Doyle, As Many as Nine State Legislatures Have Now Rejected SOCE Therapy 
Bans, VOICE OF THE VOICELESS (May 8, 2014), http://www.voiceofthevoiceless.info/as-many-as-nine-
state-legislatures-have-now-rejected-soce-therapy-bans/ (describing Voice of the Voiceless’s efforts to 
defeat state bans on the provision of conversion therapy to minors) [http://perma.cc/2VAT-FBLL]. 
102 Most recently Illinois, on August 20, 2015. Aditya Agrawal, Illinois Bans Gay Conversion 
Therapy for Minors, TIME (Aug. 21, 2015), http://time.com/4006675/illinois-bans-gay-conversion-
therapy-on-minors/ [http://perma.cc/VWP3-9Y3W]. 
103 See Cheryl Wetzstein, Gay ‘Conversion’ Therapy Bans Stall Across the Nation, THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES (May 4, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/4/gay-
conversion-therapy-bans-stall-across-the-natio [http://perma.cc/N9Q9-98K9]. 
104 Transcript of Trial at 38–39, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 18, 2015). 
105 See JOEL 2:25 INT’L, http://www.joel225.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2015). 
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Joel 2:25 does not charge for its services. The support groups are free. 
There is no sale. And if there is no sale, there is no consumer fraud. 
I consider this acceptable, if not unavoidable. Like all regulated evils, 
conversion therapy will always exist in some form. No amount of legal 
precedent and legislative action will serve to entirely eradicate certain 
individuals’ belief that homosexuality is an illness subject to cure, and no 
amount of societal change and public outreach will serve to convince all 
LGBT men and women that their sexual orientation is not a defect to be 
controlled, or corrected if possible. If this subset—this small and shrinking 
subset—of the population wishes to pursue these ends inside the 
churchyard and outside of the marketplace, then so be it. The law cannot 
prevent every self-destructive act, and while these victims may still suffer 
harm from undergoing this free conversion therapy, other potential victims 
will be saved by starving the practice out of commercial existence. State 
bans on the provision of conversion therapy to minors will continue to be 
passed. Selling the service to adults will be considered fraud, punished by 
million-dollar penalties and injunctive relief. The boundaries in which 
conversion therapists will be able to lie without fear of reprisal will shrink, 
either forcing them out of business or forcing them to alter their sales pitch 
so drastically (disclaiming any chance of success at changing their patients’ 
orientations) as to be selling an entirely different service. In time—with 
work—the practice will go extinct. 
Conversion therapists ruin lives. They convince men and women they 
are sick when they are healthy, and that they can be cured when there is 
nothing to cure. They employ unethical and dangerous treatment methods 
such as nudity and “healthy touch” which are unscientific at best and barely 
disguised opportunities for erotic contact between therapist and patient at 
worst. They fail to deliver their promised outcome—because they cannot 
do so. This is fraud. There is no room for conversion therapists, their 
services, or their misrepresentations in the American marketplace. For now, 
at least one jury in New Jersey agrees. In time, with JONAH serving as a 
model, many more will surely reach a similar verdict. 
  




APPENDIX: STATE CONSUMER FRAUD PROTECTION DETAILS106 
 
Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-1 -- 8-19-15 (Westlaw through Act 2015-
559)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute. 
Intent The general prohibition against deceptive acts 
at ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 does not require intent 
or knowledge. Certain specific prohibitions 
unrelated to conversion therapy, however, do. 
Attorney’s Fees ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(3). Note that this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief Available to the  attorney general. ALA. CODE 
§ 8-19-8(a). 
 
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 45.50.471 -- 45.50.561 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. and 2nd Spec. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Odom v. Fairbanks 
Mem’l Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 132 (Alaska 2000) 
(“Actual injury as a result of the deception is not 
required.”) 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.537. Note this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 




106 This Appendix benefits from earlier work focusing on consumer protection laws by the National 
Consumer Law Center and the American Bar Association. These earlier surveys can be found at 
CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-
STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009) 
[https://perma.cc/K5AX-LP9D & https://perma.cc/K496-BKLT] and AM. BAR ASS’N, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS (2013). This Appendix focuses on those laws most applicable to 
conversion therapy cases, and includes updated statutes through 2015. 
110:77 (2015) The Ferguson v. JONAH Verdict 
101 
Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 -- 44-1534 (Westlaw through 
1st Reg. Sess. Of 52nd Legis.)) 
Reliance Read into statute by state courts. See, e.g., 
Peery v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 574, 577 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1978) (“A prerequisite to . . . damages is 
reliance on the unlawful acts.”).  
Intent Required in cases of omission or concealment 
of a material fact. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1522(A). 
Attorney Fees If the prevailing plaintiff is the Attorney 
General, attorney fees available. ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-1534. 
Equitable Relief ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1528(A) 
 
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-101 -- 4-88-115 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2015 1st Ex. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute. 
Intent Not required by general prohibition in ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 4-88-107(a). 
Attorney Fees ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(e)–(f) 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 4-88-113(a)(1). 
 
California (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1785 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 807 
of 2015 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(e). Note this statute 
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney 
fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(2), (5) 
 
  




Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-101 -- 6-1-115 (West, Westlaw 
through 1st Reg. Sess. of 70th Gen. Assemb.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Hall v. Walter, 969 
P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998) (causation may be 
demonstrated in consumer protection action 
even if injured party did not rely on statements 
of defendant). 
Intent Intent required by most prohibitions in statute. 
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105. 
Attorney Fees COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-113(2)(b), (4). 
Note this statute permits prevailing defendants 
to collect attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief Available to the Attorney General. COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-110(1). 
 
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110a -- 42-110q (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and June Spec. Sess.)) 
Reliance Consumer need not prove reliance. See 
Hinchliffe v. Am. Motors Corp., 440 A.2d 810, 
815–16 (Conn. 1981).  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(d) 
Equitable Relief CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110m, 42-
110g(a) 
 
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511–2527, 2580–2584 (West, 
Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, Ch. 194)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Stephenson v. 
Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 
1983).  
Intent Required in cases of omission or concealment of 
a material fact. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 2513(a). 
Attorney Fees No provision for fees in statute. 
Equitable Relief DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2523 
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District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3901 -- 28-3913 (West, 
Westlaw through Oct. 21, 2015)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute. 
Intent Intent not required. See Fort Lincoln Civic Ass’n 
v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 
1055, 1073 (D.C. 2008). 
Attorney Fees D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(2)(B) 
Equitable Relief D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3909(a), 28-
3905(k)(2)(D), (F) 
 
Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.201–501.213 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 1st Reg. Sess. and Spec. A Sess. of 24th Leg.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state cases 
reading reliance requirement into statute. 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.2105. Note this 
provision grants fees to prevailing party, 
plaintiff or defendant. 
Equitable Relief Available to the enforcing authority. FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 501.207(1)(b). 
 
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-390 -- 10-1-407 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Legis. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance required. See Tiismann v. Linda Martin 
Homes Corp., 637 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 2006). 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(d). Note this statute 
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney 
fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. GA. CODE 
ANN. § 10-1-397(b)(2). 
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Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480-1 -- 480-24 (West, Westlaw through 
Act 243 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-13(a)(1), (b)(1) 
Equitable Relief HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480-13(a)(2), (b)(2), 
480-15 
 
Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601 -- 48-619 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 1st Reg. and 1st Ex. Sess. of 63rd Leg.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state cases 
reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent Intent required for deceptive practices, including 
acts of unconscionability. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 
48-603, 48-603C. 
Attorney Fees IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-606(1)(f), 48-607, 48-
608(5). Note this statute permits prevailing 
defendants to collect attorney fees in certain 
cases. 
Equitable Relief IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-606(1)(b), 48-608(1) 
 
Illinois (815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1–505/12 (West, Westlaw through 
P.A. 99-484 of 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Connick v. Suzuki 
Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584 (Ill. 1996). 
Intent Required in cases of omission or concealment 
of a material fact. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
505/2. 
Attorney Fees 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10, 10a(c) 
Equitable Relief 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7(a), 10a(c) 
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Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-0.5-1 -- 24-5-0.5-12 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance required. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-
4(a). 
Intent Intent required for major substantive violations. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-3. 
Attorney Fees IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(a). Note this 
provision grants fees to prevailing party, 
plaintiff or defendant. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. IND. CODE 
ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(c)(1). 
 
Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 714H.1–714H.8 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent Intent required. IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.3(1). 
Attorney Fees IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.5(2) 
Equitable Relief IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.5(1) 
 
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623 -- 50-640 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 50-626(b). 
Intent The general prohibition against deceptive acts at 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626(a) does not require 
intent or knowledge. Certain specific 
prohibitions unrelated to conversion therapy, 
however, do. 
Attorney Fees KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(e). Note this statute 
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney 
fees in certain cases. 
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Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.110 -- 367.993 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220(3). Note this 
provision grants fees to prevailing party, 
plaintiff or defendant. 
Equitable Relief KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.190, 367.220(1) 
 
Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401–51:1430 (Westlaw through 2014 
Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A). Note this statute 
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney 
fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 51:1407(A). 
 
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 205-A -- 214 (Westlaw through 2015 
1st Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance may be required. See State v. 
Weinschenk, 868 A.2d 200, 206 (“An act or 
practice is deceptive if it is a material 
misrepresentation, omission, act or practice that 
is likely to mislead consumers acting 
reasonably . . . .” (emphasis added)). But see id. 
at ¶ 17, 714 A.2d at 209 (denying relief to 
indirect purchasers who did not rely on the 
manufacturers’ statements).  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 213(2) 
Equitable Relief ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §§ 209, 213(1) 
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Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101 -- 13-501 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 13-302. 
Intent The general prohibition against deceptive acts at 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301(1) does 
not require intent or knowledge. Certain specific 
prohibitions, however, do. See id. § 13-301(10). 
Attorney Fees MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408(b). Note 
this statute permits prevailing defendants to 
collect attorney fees in certain cases. See id. 
§ 13-408(c). 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-403(c), 13-406. 
 
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, §§ 1–11 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 124 of 2015 1st Ann. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Aspinall v. Philip 
Morris Cos., 813 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Mass. 2004).  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9(4), 11 
Equitable Relief MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 4, 9(1), 11 
 
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.901–445.922 (West, Westlaw 
through P.A. 2015, No. 172 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required, except as by statute at 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903(1)(bb).  
Intent Certain specific provisions, unrelated to 
conversion therapy, require intent. See MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §445.903(1). 
Attorney Fees MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(2) 








Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.31, 325F.68–325F.70 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance required. See MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 325F.69(1).  
Intent Requires intent that others rely on the prohibited 
representations. MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 325F.69(1). 
Attorney Fees MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31(3a) 
Equitable Relief MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.31(3), 325F.70 
 
Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-1 -- 75-24-27 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute. 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees Not available under statute; MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 75-24-15(3) provides for fee award to 
prevailing defendant on showing of bad faith 
filing. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 75-24-9. 
 
Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.130 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Veto Sess. of 98th Gen. Assemb.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Hess v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 220 S.W.3d 758, 774 (Mo. 
2007). 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(1). Note this statute 
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney 
fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.025(1), 407.100(1) 
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Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 -- 30-14-142 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-131(2), 30-14-
133(3). Note these provisions grants fees to 
prevailing party, plaintiff or defendant. 
Equitable Relief MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-111(1), 30-14-
133(1) 
 
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1601 -- 59-1623 (West, Westlaw 
through 1st Reg. Sess. of 104th Leg.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1608(1), 59-1609 
Equitable Relief NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1608(2), 59-1609 
 
Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.600, 598.0903–598.0999 (West, 
Westlaw through June 30, 2015)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state cases 
reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent Intent required in some cases. NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 598.0915, 598.0923(2). But see id. 
§ 598.0925(1)(a) (making an “assertion of 
scientific, clinical or quantifiable fact” a 
deceptive trade practice unless the person has 
factually objective evidence substantiating the 
statement). 
Attorney Fees NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.600(3)(c) 
Equitable Relief NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.600(3)(b), 
598.0963(3), 598.0979 
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New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1–358-A:13 (Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute. 
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:11. 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10(I) 
Equitable Relief N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:4(III)(a), 358-
A:10(I) 
 
New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1–56:8-91 (West, Westlaw through 
L.2015, c. 120 and J.R. No. 7)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Gennari v. Weichert 
Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 366 (N.J. 1997).  
Intent No intent requirement. See Gennari v. Weichert 
Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 366 (N.J. 1997). 
Attorney Fees N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 
Equitable Relief N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-8, 56:8-19 
 
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 -- 57-12-22 (West, Westlaw 
through 1st Spec. Sess. of 52nd Leg.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See, e.g., Lohman v. 
Daimler–Chrysler Corp., 166 P.3d 1091, 1098 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2007). 
Intent Plaintiff must show that defendant knew or 
should have known of the deceptive nature of 
his statements under the New Mexico Unfair 
Practices Act. Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus 
Corp., 811 P.2d 1308, 1311 (N.M. 1991). 
Attorney Fees N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(C). Note this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-8, 57-12-10(A) 
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New York (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349–350-f-1 (McKinney, Westlaw 
through L.2015, ch. 1–411)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. See Oswego Laborers’ 
Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland 
Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995). 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) 
Equitable Relief N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(b), (h) 
 
North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-1 -- 75-49 (West, Westlaw 
through ch. 266, excluding ch. 240–241, 246, 258–264, of 2015 Reg. 
Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance required. See, e.g., Bus. Cabling, Inc. 
v. Yokeley, 643 S.E.2d 63, 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2007)  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-16.1. Note this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 75-14. 
 
North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 51-15-01 -- 51-15-11 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute. 
Intent Intent required. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-
15-02. 
Attorney Fees Collectible only if defendant knowingly 
committed the conduct. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 
§ 51-15-09. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 51-15-07. 
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Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01–1345.13 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Files 1–29 of 131st Gen. Assemb. and 2015 State Issues 1–2)) 
Reliance No state cases reading reliance into statute. Non-
binding precedent states reliance not required. 
See Delahunt v. Cytodyne Techs., 241 F. Supp. 
2d 827, 835 (S.D. Ohio 2003).  
Intent Intent not required; knowledge taken into 
consideration in determining whether an act is 
unconscionable. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1345.03(B). 
Attorney Fees OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(F). Note this 
statute limits recovery of attorney fees to 
knowing violations, and permits prevailing 
defendants to collect attorney fees in certain 
cases. 
Equitable Relief OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.07(A)(2), 
1345.09(D) 
 
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 751–765 (West, Westlaw through 
1st Sess. of 55th Leg.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent Most prohibitions require actual knowledge or 
reason to know of the false or misleading 
conduct. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 753. 
Attorney Fees OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 761.1(A). Note this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 756.1(A)(2). 
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Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.605–646.656 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess. effective through Oct. 5, 2015)) 
Reliance Reliance required in cases of express 
misrepresentations brought by the consumer. See 
Feitler v. Animation Celection Inc., 13 P.3d 
1044, 1047 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). Prosecutors do 
not need to prove “actual confusion or 
misunderstanding.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 646.608(3). 
Intent No intent requirement for most violations. 
Knowledge required for unconscionable tactic 
violations. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.605(9), 
646.608(1). 
Attorney Fees OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.638(3). Note this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.632, 646.638(1) 
 
Pennsylvania (73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 -- 201-9.3 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1–51)) 
Reliance Reliance required. See Toy v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 928 A.2d 186, 201 (Pa. 2007).  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-
9.2(a) 
Equitable Relief 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-4, 
201-9.2(a) 
 
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 6-13.1-1 -- 6-13.1-29 (West, 
Westlaw through ch. 285 of Jan. 2015 Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-5.2(d) 
Equitable Relief R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 6-13.1-5(a), 6-13.1-
5.2(a) 
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South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 -- 39-5-180 (Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.  
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) 
Equitable Relief S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-50(a), 39-5-140(a) 
 
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-24-1 -- 37-24-35 (Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required for criminal actions. 
Reliance required for civil actions. Nygaard v. 
Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 2007 SD 34, 
¶ 33, 731 N.W.2d 184, 196–97 (“Patients’ civil 
actions are governed by SDCL 37-24-31, which 
specifically requires a causal connection 
between the alleged violation and the damages 
suffered. . . .”). 
Intent Intent required. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-
6(1). 
Attorney Fees If the prevailing plaintiff is the attorney general, 
attorney fees available. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 37-24-23. 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 37-24-23. 
 
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-101 -- 47-18-129 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. Messer Griesheim Indus., 
Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 
457, 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(e). Note this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-108(a), 47-18-
109(b) 
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Texas (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–17.63 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance required. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)(B). 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d). Note 
that § 17.50(c) permits prevailing defendants to 
collect attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.47(a), 
17.48(a), 17.50(b)(2) 
 
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-1 -- 13-11-23 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 1st Spec. Sess.)) 
Reliance No reliance requirement in statute; no state 
cases reading reliance requirement into statute. 
Intent The general prohibition against deceptive acts at 
UTAH CODE ANN § 13-11-4(1) does not require 
intent or knowledge. Specific examples of 
deceptive acts all require knowledge or 
intention. See id. § 13-11-4(2). 
Attorney Fees UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-17.5, 13-11-19(5). 
Note the latter provision grants fees to 
prevailing party, plaintiff or defendant. 
Equitable Relief UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-17(1)(b), 13-11-
19(1)(b) 
 
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451–2466b (West, Westlaw through 1st 
Sess. Of 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 2461(b) (requiring a showing of either 
reliance or damages caused by the consumer 
fraud). 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b) 
Equitable Relief VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2458(a), 2461(b) 




Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 -- 59.1-207 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance required. See, e.g., Owens v. DRS Auto. 
Fantomworks, Inc., 764 S.E.2d 256, 260 (Va. 
2014) (“The VCPA, however, still requires 
proof, in misrepresentation cases, of the 
elements of reliance and damages.”). 
Intent No intent requirement. See, e.g., Owens v. DRS 
Auto. Fantomworks, Inc., 764 S.E.2d 256, 260 
(Va. 2014). 
Attorney Fees VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(B) 
Equitable Relief Available to the attorney general. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 59.1-203(A). 
 
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. And 1st–3rd Spec. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance not required, but proximate causation is 
required. See Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. 
Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 22 
(Wash. 2007) (“A plaintiff must establish that, 
but for the defendant’s unfair or deceptive 
practice, the plaintiff would not have suffered an 
injury.”). 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 
Equitable Relief WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.080(1), 
19.86.090 
  
110:77 (2015) The Ferguson v. JONAH Verdict 
117 
West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-5-101 -- 46A-5-107, 46A-6-101 -
- 46A-6-110, 46A-7-101 -- 46A-7-115 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance required in private actions alleging 
affirmative misrepresentation. Proximate 
causation required in cases of omission or 
concealment of material fact. W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 46A-6-106(b).  
Intent Required in cases of omission or concealment of 
a material fact. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-
102(7)(M). 
Attorney Fees W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-104. Note this 
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect 
attorney fees in certain cases. 
Equitable Relief W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-6-106(a), 46A-7-
108 
 
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60))  
Reliance Reliance not required. Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 
WI 44, ¶¶ 27–29, 749 N.W.2d 544, 550. 
Intent No intent requirement in statute. 
Attorney Fees WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(2) 
Equitable Relief Available to government departments. WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(a), (d). 
 
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-101 -- 40-12-114 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Gen. Sess.)) 
Reliance Reliance required. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-
108(a). 
Intent Intent required. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105. 
Attorney Fees Not available under statute. 
Equitable Relief Available to the enforcing authority. WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-106. 
 
